1. Long-Term Background: The UK and European Integration, 1973 to 2013

The UK joined the European Economic Community in January 1973 under Edward Heath’s Conservative government, having applied for membership twice before and been vetoed by France.

Divisions over Europe surfaced almost immediately: Harold Wilson’s Labour government held a referendum in 1975 on continued membership, partly to manage deep splits within his own party, and the result was a decisive 67.2% vote in favour of staying in, on a turnout of 64.5%.

Divisions over Europe re-emerged more seriously within the Conservative Party from the late 1980s onwards, particularly after the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 deepened European integration and provoked sustained backbench rebellions against John Major’s government.

The UK Independence Party, founded in 1993, gave organisational form to growing Euroscepticism, though for many years it remained electorally marginal. Europe became increasingly entangled with debates over immigration after the 2004 enlargement of the EU, which extended free movement rights to citizens of Poland and other new member states.

By the early 2010s, UKIP’s support had grown substantially, culminating in the party topping the poll in the 2014 European Parliament elections, the first time a party other than Labour or the Conservatives had won a UK-wide election in over a century.


2. Short-Term Background: From Coalition to Referendum, 2010 to 2016

The Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition, formed after the 2010 general election, complicated any immediate referendum commitment, since the Liberal Democrats were consistently the most pro-European of the major parties. Pressure built on David Cameron from Eurosceptic backbenchers and from UKIP’s electoral advance.

On 23 January 2013, in a speech at Bloomberg’s London offices, Cameron pledged that, if the Conservatives won a majority at the next general election, his government would renegotiate the terms of UK membership and then hold an in/out referendum by the end of 2017. This pledge was repeated in the Conservative Party’s 2015 general election manifesto.

Having won a majority in May 2015, Cameron’s government secured passage of the European Union Referendum Act 2015, authorising the vote.

Renegotiation talks with EU partners covered four broad areas: economic governance, competitiveness, an exemption from the EU’s commitment to ‘ever-closer union’, and restrictions on welfare payments to EU migrants.

After a European Council summit in Brussels on 18 and 19 February 2016, a deal was agreed, described as a new settlement for the UK within the EU, though widely judged by commentators to be more modest than Cameron had originally sought.

On 20 February 2016, Cameron announced the referendum date, 23 June 2016, and confirmed that Cabinet ministers would, unusually, be free to campaign on either side of the question rather than being bound by collective responsibility.


3. Why Cameron Called the Referendum

4. The Campaign: Groups, Messages and Arguments

The campaign groups

On 13 April 2016, the Electoral Commission designated Vote Leave and Britain Stronger in Europe as the official lead campaigns for Leave and Remain respectively, giving each a higher spending limit of £7 million, a free mailshot to households, referendum broadcasts and public funding.

Vote Leave had been founded in October 2015 by the campaign strategists Matthew Elliott and Dominic Cummings, was chaired by the Labour MP Gisela Stuart, and beat a rival bid for designation from Grassroots Out, a group backed by Nigel Farage and UKIP.

Farage instead continued to campaign through Leave.EU and Grassroots Out, giving the Leave side two distinct strands: Vote Leave’s cross-party, deliberately ‘positive’ message with less emphasis on immigration, and Farage’s more immigration-focused, populist campaigning.

Britain Stronger in Europe, launched in October 2015 and chaired by the businessman Stuart Rose, led the Remain campaign, working closely with the government’s own communications operation and supported by most Labour MPs, organised separately as Labour In for Britain under Alan Johnson, as well as the Liberal Democrats, the SNP, Plaid Cymru and the majority of large business organisations.

The Leave case

The Remain case

5. Key Figures

David Cameron. Conservative Prime Minister from 2010, who had promised the referendum since 2013 and led the campaign for Remain; he announced his resignation the day after the result.

George Osborne. Chancellor of the Exchequer under Cameron and a prominent Remain campaigner, who warned of an emergency ‘punishment’ Budget of tax rises and spending cuts if the country voted to leave.

Jeremy Corbyn. Labour leader from September 2015, who nominally backed Remain but was criticised, including by some of his own MPs, for campaigning without great enthusiasm given his own long-standing scepticism about the EU.

Boris Johnson. former Mayor of London and Conservative MP, who became the most prominent public face of Vote Leave after declaring for Leave in February 2016, a move widely seen as crucial to the credibility of the Leave campaign.

Michael Gove. Conservative Justice Secretary and a close ally of Cameron, who broke with the Prime Minister to campaign for Leave and provided much of the intellectual and legal case against continued membership.

Nigel Farage. leader of UKIP and the most prominent Eurosceptic politician of the period, who fronted Leave.EU and Grassroots Out rather than the officially designated Vote Leave campaign and focused heavily on immigration.

Dominic Cummings. co-founder and campaign director of Vote Leave alongside Matthew Elliott, widely credited as the principal strategist behind the ‘Take Back Control’ slogan and the campaign’s data-led targeting of voters.

Arron Banks. insurance businessman and UKIP donor who provided the bulk of the funding for Leave.EU, the rival Eurosceptic campaign fronted by Farage; the Electoral Commission later fined Leave.EU over its spending return and referred Banks to the National Crime Agency over the source of an £8 million loan, an investigation that concluded in 2019 with no evidence of criminal wrongdoing.


6. Key Events of the Campaign

7. The Result: What Happened and Why

Leave won with 51.9% of the vote (17,410,742 votes) to Remain’s 48.1% (16,141,241 votes), a margin of 1,269,501 votes, on a turnout of 72.2%, higher than any UK general election since 1992.

More people voted Leave than had ever voted for any party or candidate in UK electoral history to that point, giving the result a strong claim to a democratic mandate despite the closeness of the percentage margin.

The result varied sharply across the UK. England and Wales recorded majorities for Leave, while Scotland and Northern Ireland recorded majorities for Remain, and within England London was the only region to vote Remain.

NationLeaveRemainTurnout
England53.4%46.6%73.0%
Wales52.5%47.5%71.7%
Scotland38.0%62.0%67.2%
Northern Ireland44.2%55.8%62.7%

Analysis of the results also showed strong correlations with age and education:


8. The Aftermath: Short-Term and Long-Term Outcomes

Short-term outcomes

David Cameron formally left office on 13 July 2016.

In the Conservative leadership contest that followed, Boris Johnson was initially the favourite but withdrew after Michael Gove announced his own candidacy; the contest was resolved when Andrea Leadsom withdrew, leaving Theresa May to become Prime Minister unopposed.

The UK government notified the European Council of its intention to withdraw under Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union on 29 March 2017, after the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Miller case that Parliament’s authorisation was required first.

May called a snap general election in June 2017 seeking a stronger negotiating mandate but lost her Commons majority and had to govern with the support of the Democratic Unionist Party.

Prolonged parliamentary conflict followed during 2017 to 2019, with MPs rejecting May’s negotiated Withdrawal Agreement on three occasions; she resigned in July 2019 and was succeeded by Boris Johnson, who called a further general election in December 2019, fought substantially on the slogan ‘Get Brexit Done’, which the Conservatives won with an 80-seat majority.

The Withdrawal Agreement was ratified, and the UK formally left the EU on 31 January 2020, with a transition period, during which existing arrangements continued, ending on 31 December 2020 alongside a new Trade and Cooperation Agreement.

Long-term outcomes

The referendum realigned party politics along Leave and Remain lines.

These lines cut across the traditional left-right divide, contributing to the loss of previously safe Labour seats in Leave-voting areas, often termed the ‘Red Wall’, to the Conservatives in 2019, alongside gains for pro-Remain parties such as the Liberal Democrats and the SNP in strongly Remain-voting areas.

The divergence between Scotland’s Remain vote and the UK-wide Leave result fed directly into the Scottish Government’s case for a further independence referendum, an attempt that was tested in the courts and rejected by the UK Supreme Court in November 2022, which ruled that the Scottish Parliament could not legislate for such a referendum without Westminster’s consent.

The need to avoid a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland produced further and continuing difficulty, addressed first through the Northern Ireland Protocol of 2019 and later through the Windsor Framework of 2023, both of which remained sources of political contention. Managing the practical UK-EU relationship, including periodic trade frictions and renegotiation of specific arrangements, has remained a recurring feature of UK politics for years after the vote itself.


9. Conclusion: Was this the ‘Last’ UK Referendum?

There is a reasonable case that the 2016 referendum may prove to have been the last UK-wide referendum for some time to come, and possibly the last of its kind altogether.

Several features of the Brexit experience point in this direction.

In the years since 2016, no further UK-wide referendum has been held, and the Supreme Court’s 2022 ruling has, for now, closed off a further Scottish independence referendum without Westminster’s agreement.

Taken together, this pattern suggests that governments of both main parties have preferred to resolve major constitutional questions since 2016 through general elections and ordinary parliamentary process rather than through further referendums, a marked change from the practice of the two decades before.

This conclusion should, however, be treated as a reasoned judgement rather than a certainty.

Demand for a further Scottish independence referendum has not disappeared, and a future shift in Scotland’s political arithmetic, or a significant change in the UK’s relationship with the EU, could yet revive the case for another UK-wide vote.

Whether 2016 turns out to have been the last UK referendum, or simply the most recent in a sequence that resumes when political conditions allow, remains an open question for students of UK politics to weigh rather than one that can be answered definitively at this stage.